Following the industrial organization approach to banking, we investigate the effects of banking conduct on the investment cycle. To achieve this, we extend the second order accelerator (SOA) model in discrete time, introducing the interest rate on loans.
Introduction
The existence of adjustment costs in the transformation of the investment expenditure into capital has been usually used in the investment literature to describe the discrepancy between actual and desired capital (Hay & Morris, 1991) . The second order accelerator mechanism (SOA) provides an explanation of the endogenous origination of the investment cycle, implying the presence of investment costs both in the changes of capital stock and in the changes of the level of investment. Also, it complies with the stylized facts (Hillinger & Sebold Bender, 1992 Hillinger & Weser (1988) and Weser (1992) study the aggregation problem in the business cycles theory in the SOA context. Along the same lines, Woitek (1995) and Barnett et al. (1996) In this paper, we consider the implications of banking conduct on the investment cycle. For this reason, we extend the second order accelerator model in discrete time , introducing the interest rate on loans which is supposed to be endogenous. Relating the firms' investment decision with the oligopolistic banking sector, we present two concepts of our model. In the first case, we consider a traditional Cournot game in which the banks make their decision on the quantities of loans and deposits simultaneously. In the second case, we assume a Stackelberg game in which they act strategically. Our purpose is the investigation of the effects of the banking conduct on the path of capital. The simulation process is put forward to verify our theoretical results and examine the effectiveness of monetary policy. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the threeequation SOA model for fixed investment in discrete time (Dalla & Varelas, 2015) . Section 3 presents the endogenous monetary term augmented SOA model while section 4 provides the solution. In sections 5 and 6, the calibration and the simulation processes are showed respectively. Section 7 examines the effects of monetary policy on the time path of capital. Section 8 concludes.
The SOA Model in Discrete Time
The second order accelerator mechanism Hillinger, 2005) for fixed investment in discrete time ) is derived by the following three-equation structural model:
where c: the speed of adjustment, b: a parameter of investors' behavior, Equation ( ( 1) 2 (1 )
The general solution of equation (4) 
the corresponding characteristic equation is:
and the crucial for this analysis value of the discriminant of the characteristic equation is:
It is demonstrated that in the case of a negative discriminant, the homogeneous equation (5) generates trigonometric oscillations with period equal to 2 /   . The characteristic roots are conjugate complex numbers with modulus or absolute value (R) equal to 1 . R c   From the assumptions of the structural model concerning the value interval of c, it is deduced that the absolute value of the complex conjugate roots is less than unity. Therefore, capital converges towards its equilibrium, following a trigonometric oscillatory path with decreasing amplitude. The stability of this system can also be ensured by the satisfaction of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions (Gandolfo, 1996) . The critical condition for the existence of dynamic stability is inequality (8):
Regarding the particular solution of (4), it can be interpreted as the equilibrium level of capital. Applying the method of undetermined coefficients, we obtain that:
Hence, the steady-state of capital is equal to its desired level.
On the whole, the behavior of capital over time in the case of the trigonometric oscillatory movement is described by the following equation, which is also the general solution of this model:
where Α 1 , Α 2 ℝ are arbitrary constants which can be derived using two initial conditions.
Extension of the Model: The Endogenous Monetary Term
In this section, we propose an augmented second order accelerator model for fixed investment in discrete time that incorporates an endogenous monetary term, the interest rate on loans. In the context of an oligopolistic banking sector with two banks, 
, 0
Relations ( where the interest rate on loans is introduced. The parameter d is negative, expressing the negative relation between the interest rate on loans and the desired level of net investment. Moreover, under the assumption of the absence of substitution among the factors of production, the production function is given by equation (14), where A>0 denotes the parameter of technology.
Relations (15) to (21) determine the oligopolistic banking sector. In particular,
equations (15) and (16) describe the total volumes of loans and deposits respectively, where it L and it D denote the individual amounts of loans and deposits of each bank.
In addition, equation (17) is the inverse demand function for loans. Furthermore, the inverse supply function for deposits is given by equation ( 
Solution of the Model
From equations (11) to (13), we obtain the reduced form in the product market in terms of capital:
( 1) 2 (1 )
Moving now into the oligopolistic banking sector, the maximization problem of the individual bank can be stated as:
In the context of the Cournot duopoly, each bank is profit maximizing given the volumes of deposits and loans of the other bank. Then, the interest rates on deposits and loans are determined in the corresponding market. Therefore, solving the above maximization problem and using the production function (14), we derive the equilibrium interest rate on loans as a function of capital:
On the other hand, in the case of the Stackelberg game the banks act strategically, deciding over the amounts of deposits and loans sequentially. More specifically, in the first stage, the "leader" bank (bank 1) chooses its own level of deposits and loans. In the second stage, the "follower" bank (bank 2) maximizes its profit function taking the leader bank's volumes of deposits and loans as given. The interest rates on deposits and loans are then determined in the corresponding market. So, following the backward induction method to solve this game and using the production function (14), we get the equilibrium interest rate on loans in terms of capital:
After the substitution of relations (24) & (25) in (22), we derive the second order accelerator model for fixed investment in the respective case. Their functional forms are described by equations (26) & (27) respectively:
Both relations (26) & (27) are second order difference equations with constant coefficients. Following the same methodology with the initial model, firstly we determine the general solution of the homogeneous equations corresponding to equation (26) and (27) , that is of:
The relative characteristic equations are respectively:
The discriminant in each case has as follows:
In both cases of banking interaction, the second order accelerator mechanism can 
Now, we apply the method of undetermined coefficients to obtain the particular solutions of equations (26) and (27) . These solutions are interpreted as the equilibrium level of capital in each case of banking interaction. For this reason, they should be positive. Their functional form has as follows 2 :
At this point we have to mention that we expect a lower equilibrium level of capital in the case of the Cournot game (relation (36)) rather than in the case of the Stackelberg game (relation (37)). This remark is a result of the intuition behind the comparison between the Cournot and the Stackelberg equilibria (Church & Ware, 2000) . In particular, the total equilibrium Cournot level of loans is lower than the Stackelberg one. Consequently, the inverse demand function for loans implies that the equilibrium interest rate on loans is higher in the case of the Cournot interaction.
Taking into consideration that net investment is related inversely to the interest rate on loans, the steady-state of capital should be lower in the Cournot model rather than in Stackelberg model.
To conclude, the behavior of capital over time in the cases of the Cournot and the 
where Α 3 , Α 4 , A 5 , A 6 ℝ are arbitrary constants which can be derived using two initial conditions.
Calibration
We begin our analysis with the presentation of the values assigned to our model (7), (32) and (33) radians angle. Therefore, we infer approximately that the resulting movement of capital in all the examined cases is a periodic oscillation with period equal to 9 and decreasing amplitude.
From equations (9), (36) and (37), the equilibrium level of capital in the cases of the initial SOA model, the Cournot competition and the Stackelberg game is deduced 3 The simulation results of this section were derived using the program Wolfram Mathematica 9.0. In the monetary term augmented SOA model both the minimum reserve requirements and the interbank rate are determined exogenously by the Central Bank. Relations (24) and (25) imply that the interest rate on loans, both under the assumption of the Cournot interaction, as well as, when the Stackelberg interaction is the case, depends on the interbank rate. Therefore, monetary policy via the interbank rate affects the equilibrium interest rate on loans and consequently the path of capital over time.
Taking into consideration that our model is deterministic which implies full information, perfect foresight and no uncertainty, we examine the effects of expansionary monetary policy via the interbank rate on the motion of capital.
We assume that capital lies on the steady-state at the period 0 t  either when the Cournot interaction is the case or when the Stackelberg game is considered. At period 1 t  , the Central bank implements expansionary monetary policy, decreasing the interbank rate from 0.1 to 0.05. Figures 2 and 3 show the resulting transition path of capital for the Cournot and Stackelberg game respectively. It can be clearly seen that in both cases the decrease in the interbank rate leads to an increase in capital from its initial steady-state to a new higher steady-state over 19 periods. Hence, monetary policy via the interbank rate is effective. 4 The results of monetary policy were deduced using the Matlab R2008a software. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we extended the second order accelerator model for fixed investment in discrete time , incorporating the endogenous interest rate on loans in it. Following the industrial organization approach to banking and considering, on the one hand, a Cournot game of banking interaction and on the other a Stackelberg game, we investigated the effects of the introduction of this endogenous monetary term on the ability of the SOA mechanism to originate investment cycles.
We found that our augmented model can interpret the existence of investment cycles in terms of capital as well.
Moreover, we proceeded to a simulation process. Our results verified the dynamic properties of our theoretical system. The comparison between the standard threeequation SOA model and the two versions of the endogenous monetary term augmented SOA model showed that in all the cases capital follows a trigonometric oscillatory path that converges towards the steady-state. The difference among the three concepts of SOA lies on the equilibrium level of capital. As it was expected, the introduction of the interest rate on loans leads to a lower steady-state of capital, with the latter being even lower in the case of Cournot interaction in the banking sector. 
